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NOTRE DAME
LAWYER
A Quarterly Law Review
VOL XX

JUNE, 1945

NO. 4

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY
III
IN

THE

AMERICAN COLONIES

N the American colonies in the eighteenth century a situation arose quite parallel to that which existed during the
contests between the crown and the courts in seventeenthcentury England. In England, the prerogatives of the crown
were not clearly defined. Wide claims could be made for
them and equally strong claims could be made for limitations on them. A body of absolute political doctrine as to the
powers of rulers had grown up on the Continent, and the
two countries which then set the fashion in politics, France
and Spain, were autocratic monarchies. On the other hand,
the English lawyers had received a taught tradition of
limitations on governmental action, subjection of officials
to the law of the land, and rights guaranteed by law to the
subject. In America, a rapidly developing country, with expanding trade and commerce, with great natural wealth,
with an adventurous pioneer population, with its own legislatures and courts, found itself politically thirteen distinct
provinces, each subject to absolute government from Westminster. The legal incidents of the relation between the
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British government and the colonies were not clearly defined.
There had been no need of defining them. In the era of
colonization the settlements had been feeble, had needed the
protection of the home government, and had raised no questions as to its powers. But the home government in the
eighteenth century, like the English king in the seventeenth
century, needed money badly and was looking for sources
of revenue. As the king sought to raise money by impositions
by his own authority, without the consent of Parliament representing the people who were to pay, so the home government sought to raise money from the colonies without applying to them or. obtaining their consent. Moreover, the regime
of absolute monarchy at which the Stuarts aimed involved
the disregard of individual interests which had long been recognized and restriction on individual activity and enterprise
which inevitably met with resistance in a time of faith in individual reason, breakdown of authoritarianism, and restless
acquisitive self-assertion. In colonial America of the eighteenth century the completely centralized government
through the Board of Trade and Plantations, the Privy
Council, and Parliament, with no consciousness of limitations
beyond what Mr. Dooley called gentlemanly restraint, involved like disregard of recognized individual interests and
restrictions on individual activity and enterprise. People
who had cleared the wilderness, fought with the savages,
and established flourishing centers of trade and commerce
in the new world did not take kindly to the restraints which
the colonial status was held to involve.
Lawyers played a chief part in the contests with the
Stuarts. They found their weapons in the doctrines which
had been worked out by the experience of the common-law
courts in trying official action by the provisions of the Great
Charter. Coke made the cases under the Plantagenets the
material for a commentary on Magna Carta which made a
treaty between the paramount landlord and his tenants in
chief a legal document defining limitations in the relation of
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ruler and ruled. What the medieval cases and tradition were
to Coke, Coke's Second Institute and the decisions of the
common-law courts he discusses or that followed him were
to the American lawyers before the Revolution. In each case
the opposition was both legal and political. Lawyers took
part in each in both capacities. But the lawyers gave a legal
turn to the political opposition and the result was a nation
ruled-by law and on this side of the water a written constitution as fundamental law carrying on the medieval English
idea of the law of the land.
So steeped were the eighteenth-century colonial lawyers
in Coke's teachings, for Coke's Institutes were the most authoritative law books available to them and they were dealing with a tradition not a code, that the controversial literature of the era of the Revolution, if it is to be understood,
must be read or interpreted by a common-law lawyer. Indeed, he must be a common-law lawyer of the nineteenthcentury type, brought up to read and reread Coke and Blackstone till he got the whole feeling and atmosphere of those
who led resistance to the home government. It was a wrench
to many a cavalier lawyer, whose father had fought for
Charles I, to stand for the law of the land against James II.
It was a wrench for many a loyal Englishman in the colonies,
trained in law in one of the Inns of Court, to take a stand
which branded him as a rebel because he held to the teachings of his law books and felt bound to resist the claim of
the British government to absolute rule.
While according to American legal theory the colonists
brought the common law of England with them when they
came to the new world, there was for some time no need of
so advanced and technical a body of legal precepts as the
seventeenth-century English law. Law, as distinguished from
laws, requires lawyers, and law and lawyers are little needed
until there is a considerable economic development. A frontier society needs little more than offhand magisterial justice.
For example, the beginnings of the administration of justice
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in New England were by no means legal justice. An English
lawyer who came to Boston about 1637 wrote in 1642 that
the colonial tribunals ignored the English common law and
sought to administer the Mosaic law. The laws in seventeenth-century England were hard on the dissenters who
were largely colonizing America and the experience of administration of justice which many of them had had was
one of high-handed enforcement of penal statutes by magistrates. Accordingly, they were inclined to assume that law
was "a dark and knavish business." Where the layman in
the colonies at that time knew something about law he was
likely to find that its ideals were those of the relationally organized society of the Middle Ages and so out of touch with
those of the pioneers who were opening up the wilderness.
Need for law and for lawyers came with the economic development of the colonies and the rise of trade and commerce. From the beginning there had been colonial legislation, subject to disallowance for not conforming to the common law or to English legislation, and so calling for some
knowledge of English law by those who drafted it. Appeals
to the Privy Council required more care on the part of court
and counsel and parties since the expense of taking a case
to Westminster and the delay and expense in defending a
judgment there were serious. In the latter part of the seventeenth century a system of courts replaced legislative justice
and magistrates, and at the end of the century the courts
.f review began to be manned by trained lawyers. Moreover, at the same time and in the eighteenth century there
came to be an increasing number of lawyers in the colonies
who had been trained in the Inns of Court.
In Pennsylvania, Andrew Hamilton, a barrister and bencher of Gray's Inn came to Philadelphia in 1682. He is well
known for his defense of Zenger in 1735, the pioneer case
on freedom of the press, in which he argued successfully for
the common-law rights of Englishmen. In the time just before the Revolution five barristers of the Middle Temple
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were at the Pennsylvania bar, and two of them signed the
Declaration of Independence.
In Virginia, William Fitzhugh, educated as a lawyer in
England, was practicing in 1680. In the first half of the
eighteenth century there were six who had been trained in
the Inns of Court, three of them becoming attorneys-general. The leader of these was Sir John Randolph who at his
death in 1737 was counted among the conspicuous leaders
of the profession in America. Between 1750 and the Revolution there was an exceptionally strong group of lawyers in
Virginia, many of them trained in the Inns of Court, and
others taught by those so trained, among them George
Wythe, who afterwards decided one of the pioneer cases
refusing to give effect to a legislative order contrary to the
state constitution, and George Mason, who drafted the first
American bill of rights.
In Maryland, Daniel Dulany, Sr., a barrister of Gray's
Inn, was admitted to the bar of the Provincial Court in 1710.
One of the first items in the events that led to the Revolution is his pamphlet, "The Right of the Inhabitants of Maryland to the Benefit of English Laws" (1728), growing out of
disallowance of provincial legislation by the proprietor.
Daniel Dulany, Jr. also trained in the Inns of Court, admitted in 1747, was the leader of the bar in struggles over
arbitrary assertions of legislative-powers by royal governors
and in the agitation over the Stamp Act. His pamphlet,
"Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes on the
British Colonies for the Purpose of Raising a Revenue by
Act of Parliament" (1765) is one of the classics of that controversy. Four Maryland lawyers who signed the Declaration
of Independence had studied law in the Inns of Court.
In Massachusetts, in 1647, the Governor and Assistants
ordered the importation, among other books, of two copies
each of Coke's First and Second Institute and of Coke's Reports. This was said to be done "to the end that we may have
better light for making and proceeding about laws." But the
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leaders of the bar who took part in the agitation over the
Stamp Act and the events that led to the Revolution were
not educated in the Inns of Court. Nor were the lawyers of
colonial New York who resisted the attempt of the royal
governor to review verdicts of the jury on the facts. But
their reading of the law books made them obnoxious to the
governor, who wrote to Lord Halifax that they enlarged the
popular side of government and depreciated the powers of
the crown.
Of the signers of the Declaration of Independence from
North Carolina, both were lawyers, one of whom had studied
under James Otis and the other under Edward Pendleton.
Thus both were grounded in Coke's doctrines. Three of the
lawyers practising in the province before the Revolution were
trained in England.
In South Carolina, thirteen of the lawyers at the bar before the Revolution had studied in the Inns of Court. The
leader among them was John Rutledge, barrister of the Inner
Temple in 1761, foremost in opposition to the Stamp Act, a
signer of the Declaration of Independence, and Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1795.
It will have been seen that lawyers trained in the Inns of
Court and those who had studied in their offices in America
took an active part in the contests which led to the Revolution. But where there were no lawyers trained in the Inns
of Court, lawyers who had "read law" had read Coke's Institutes, published between 1628 and 1644, the authoritative
systematic exposition of the common law down to Blackstone's Commentaries, published 1765-1769. Thus they were
brought up on ideas of "the law of the land," and of the immemorial rights of Englishmen guaranteed by Magna Carta.
Blackstone at once became the first book to be studied by
American lawyers and held that place till the beginning of
the present century. The Commentaries had an exceptionally large sale in the colonies. We are told that twenty-five
hundred copies were bought in America before the Revolu-
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tion. A subscription reprint was published in Philadelphia
in 1771-1772 and the list of subscribers is headed by "John
Adams, Esq., barrister at law, Boston, Massachusetts Bay."
Blackstone set forth Coke's doctrine in readable form.
Five ideas were assumed by American lawyers of the time
of the Revolution, and by our lawyers of the nineteenth century, as involved in government according to law in contrast to absolute monarchy. They were: (1) The idea of a
fundamental law, the "law of the land," to which all official
and governmental action was bound to conform, which law
was to be applied by the courts in the course of orderly litigation according to the common law, and could be invoked
against officials by any one aggrieved. (2) The idea of immemorial rights of Englishmen, secured by the law of the
land, and of the common law in which they were recognized
as the birthright of Englishmen and so of Americans. Coke's
Second Institute speaks of the law of the land as the "best
inheritance that the subject hath" and is full of old lawFrench maxims expressing that idea. (3) The idea of authoritative declarations of these rights in charters and bills
of rights. Indeed, there was a precedent for a written constituition, such as all Americans believed in after independence, in the Instrument of Government adopted under the
Commonwealth in 1653. It contained a few declarations of
fundamental rights and provided "that all laws, statutes, ordinances, and clauses in any law statute and ordinance, to
the contrary of the aforesaid liberty shall be esteemed null
and void." (4) The idea of an independent judiciary, as set
forth in the English Bill of Rights of 1688, to administer the
fundamental law, and of lawmaking by a body distinct from
the executive. (5) The idea of courts refusing to apply statutes in contravention of the fundamental law; an idea made
familiar not only by the seventeenth-century cases which the
lawyers found in the Abridgments, or Digests of reported
decisions, and reports, but also by appeals to the Privy Council in which statutes were held to conflict with colonial
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charters or to run counter to provisions in charters for legislation in accordance with or not repugnant to the common
law.
In 1687, the first American law book was published in
Philadelphia. Its title is as significant as its contents. The
title page reads: "The Excellent Privilege of Liberty &
Property," being the Birthright of the Free-born Subjects of
England. Containing I Magna Charta, with a learned Comment upon it. II The Confirmation of the Charters of the
Liberties of England and of the Forrest, made in the 35th
year of Edward the First. III A Statute made the 34 Edw.
I commonly called De Tallageo non Concedendo; wherein
all Fundamental Laws, Liberties and Customs are confirmed. With a Comment upon it. IV An abstract of the
Pattent granted by the King to William Penn and his Heirs
and Assigns for the Province of Pennsilvania. V and Lastly,
the Charter of Liberties granted by the said William Penn to
the Free-men and Inhabitants of the Province of Pennsilvania and Territories thereto annexed, in America." There
is a Latin motto to the effect that a greater inheritance comes
to each of us from law and laws than from parents. The commentary is taken from Coke's Second Institute. In 1721 a
book was published in Boston entitled "English liberties or
the freeborn subject's inheritance." It contains among other
things, Magna Carta, the confirmatory statute of Edward I,
the Habeas Corpus Act, a Declaration of the Liberties of the
Subject, and the Petition of Right. Coke's Second Institute
is drawn on extensively. The law books of the time commonly
repeat out of Coke's Commentary a law-French saying of
the Middle Ages that the "law is the greatest inheritance
the king hath, for without the law there would be no king and
no inheritance." It should be added that on the eve of the
Revolution, in 1774, in a case of Campbell v. Hall, in the
King's Bench, an action to recover from the King's collector
of customs a duty imposed by royal proclamation upon sugar
exported from the island of Gremada, the court, in an opin-
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ion by Lord Mansfield, one of the greatest of common-law
judges, rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that
where a local legislature had been set up, the pre-existing
law of the island could only be changed by that legislature
or by Parliament. Thus while American lawyers were urging
restrictions of fundamental law which forbade impositions
upon the colonies without their consent, the law of the land
was being enforced against the crown and its officers in the
nearby Caribbean. This could but confirm American lawyers
in their belief in a fundamental law.
Legislation in South Carolina in 1712 adopted as the law
of that Province "all such statutes in the kingdom of England as declare the rights and liberties of the subjects and
enact the better securing of the same," and "such parts of
statutes as declare the rights and liberties of subjects." Such
statutes, aimed at the royal governors, grew out of friction
between the lawyers, arguing for restrictions resting on
fundamental law, and the absentee government by authority
of the crown. They asserted the immemorial rights of Englishmen. The tract of Daniel Dulany, Sr. in 1728, Andrew
Hamilton's argument at the trial of Zenger (1735), Otis's
argument against writs of assistance (1761), the tract of the
Younger Daniel Dulany against the Stamp Act (1765), and
the Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress
(1774), all insist upon the common-law rights of Englishmen as the rights of the colonists. It is worth while to quote
from the latter: "That our ancestors who first settled these
colonies were, at the time of their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties and immunities
of free and natural born subjects within the realm of England." John Adams in 1765 argued that the Stamp Act was
"utterly void" (1) as contrary to the natural rights of man
and (2) contrary to the liberties of Englishmen. It should be
noted here how a philosophical political idea and a historical
legal idea are fusing in the argument of one who perhaps
was more politician than lawyer. It will be necessary to
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speak more fully of this fusion in another connection. The
Continental Congress made its claims in title of "the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the several charters or compacts." But it asserts
them as Englishmen.
It may well be asked at this point, why did none of these
charters of liberties and no declaration of rights down to the
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 include freedom of writing
and speaking and freedom of the press which now stand first
in our national Bill of Rights and in bills of rights generally
in the states?
It is not difficult to understand why nothing was said on
this subject in the Constitution of the United States as first
adopted. The men who were framing that Constitution were
chiefly interested in a frame of government to supersede the
old Articles of Confederation. George Mason, who drew the
Virginia Bill of Rights did urge one for the federal constitution, but little attention was paid to him. It was considered
that each state had a bill of rights, needed because of the
plenary lawmaking power of the states. But the powers of
the federal government were only those given it by the Constitution, and it was thought that power to do the things
feared and guarded against by bills of rights, had not been
given to the general government. However, people generally
in the country feared that the new government they had set
up over their local governments would do the things the
British government had done and insisted on the first nine
amendments. The two things in the bills of rights that are
not in Coke's Second Institute are freedom of the press and
freedom of religion, and the reason is historical.
Today the Supreme Court of the United States holds that
the provisions in the first amendment as to freedom of
speech and of the press and freedom of religion are included
in the fourteenth amendment; that they are to be deduced
from the idea of liberty which is secured against the states by
that amendment. That is the logical deduction from the idea
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of liberty as Coke defines it. Logically Coke could very well
have argued for freedom of speech and of the press in his
Commentary on Magna Carta. Why didn't he? The reason
is historical. In the seventeeth century the common-law
courts and lawyers had not been confronted with these questions. In his day they were in the jurisdiction of the Star
Chamber, not of the courts. In the Middle Ages the King
was in a pretty constant struggle with the feudal nobility as
to who was to hold the reins of government. Before and after the Reformation there was long a struggle between
state and church whether there was to be a political organization of society or -a religious organization. Thus the dignity of the political authorities was a very important consideration. Any one who criticized the government was
weakening the power of the government in these struggles.
The government in consequence was very jealous of any
criticism of any sort. Such cases were dealt with in the Star
Chamber, in which common-law judges sat with others and
no doubt operated in some measure as a check. But that
tribunal was an administrative agency. If one criticized the
government so as to endanger its supremacy or interfere with
its efficient functioning, he was brought up before and disciplined by the Star Chamber. The consequence was that
there are no discussions of freedom of speaking (except in
Parliament) in the Second Institute.
But there came to be every reason in the eighteenth century why the colonies should be concerned about freedom
of speech and of the press as they began to be irked by the
complete centralization of power at Westminster and by the
high-handed methods of royal governors. The pamphlets
published by leading lawyers against the Stamp Act, the
pamphlets attacking the disallowance of colonial statutes by
the Privy Council, the legal arguments against arbitrary
conduct of royal governors were considered seditious by the
home government and the governors. But juries commonly
thought otherwise, so that there was a continual contest to
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get these matters away from juries and before appointees of
and dependents upon the government.
After the Star Chamber was abolished, Charles II attempted to use the courts by orders in the nature of an injunction
against publication of matter obnoxious to the government.
Chief Justice Scroggs was impeached in 1681 among other
things for such an order, but escaped by dissolution of Parliament. The method of dealing with such cases which remained was called an information ex officio brought by the
Attorney-General for a seditious libel. A seditious libel for
the purposes of this proceeding was a publication which the
government did not like. It might criticize the conduct of
the government or of some particular official. If Parliament
was criticized, or some member of Parliament, the House of
Commons took it up. Between the Restoration (1660) and
the Revolution, there were no less than forty-two cases of
imprisonment by order of the House of Commons for criticizing Parliament or some member of Parliament. But if the
crown was criticized, or the ministers of the crown, resort
was had to information ex officio by the Attorney-General.
What this signified was that it did not require indictment
by a Grand Jury. In an ordinary case of a serious crime
there had to be an indictment or presentment by a grand
jury. But if the king or the ministers of the king were criticized the Attorney-General filed an information ex officio
on which the accused could be tried. The difficulty in these
cases was to get juries to convict. The sheriff was appointed
by the crown and removed by the crown, and he picked the
jury. For example, in the trial of the Seven Bishops for presenting a statement to James II as to his illegal Declaration
of Indulgence, the king's brewer was on the jury. He is reported to have said that if he found the bishops guilty he
could sell no more beer to the people, while if he found them
not guilty he could sell no more to the king. One need not
say that the latter alternative was the reason why the sheriff
put him on the jury.
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Of the English cases which attracted particular attention
between the reign of James Ii and the adoption of our federal constitution there are ten which stand out. The political
literature of the time is full of discussion of them. It is
enough to mention here the case of John Wilkes in 1765, the
cases of Almon, Miller, and Woodfall, who published the letter of Junis to the king (1770), and the case of the Dean of
St. Asaph's in 1783. The Dean of St. Asaph's procured the
publication of a document called "A Dialogue Between a
Scholar and a Farmer," written by a barrister, which severely criticized the contemporary situation in British politics.
Accordingly, an information ex officio was filed and the Dean
was tried in the Court of King's Bench. The Chief Justice,
following the law which had been laid down in the time of
the Stuarts, charged the jury that it was for the court and
not the jury to say what was a seditious libel: all that the
jury could try was whether it had been published or procured to be published by the accused. But the jury in many
of these cases, as in the case of the Seven Bishops, took advantage of its power to render a general verdict of acquittal,
in spite of the charge of the court.
Such was the situation in eighteenth-century England.
Much the same story is to be told for the colonies. The first
newspaper published in this country, published in 1690, was
suppressed after the first issue because it indulged in reflections on the colonial government. The second was subjected
to a censorship, the censors being appointed by the royal governor. Censorship was abolished in England in the reign of
William III, but it continued in the colonies. It was an instistution of the church in the Middle Ages, very proper possibly as to books on matters spiritual, but carried over into
matters temporal, particularly matters political, open to
grave objections. To pass, however, to the legal side of the
matter, the case which immediately excited the public mind
was that of John Peter Zenger in New York in 1734.
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One Cosby was appointed Governor of New York by the
Crown in 1734. He reached New York in August of that year,
having had a long voyage. In the interval between his appointment and his arrival a certain Van Dam did the things
to be done by the Governor for which fees were chargeable
and collected the emoluments of the office. Governor Cosby
claimed the money as belonging to him by virtue of his office
from the date of his appointment, while Van Dam claimed
a set off for his work in performing the duties. The Governor found that the local juries were not going to be favorable to him so he conceived the idea of setting up an equity
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. He had the power of appointing and removing judges and he removed the Chief Justice, after the manner of a Stuart king because the judge's
view of the law did not meet the Governor's wishes. When
Van Dam tried to bring a separate action to assert his claim
he found that he could not get process served because the
Governor had the appointment and removal of those who
alone could serve writs. Between 1701 and 1728, the legislature had refused repeatedly to set up a court of equity which
could proceed without a jury. The Privy Council could reject any measure for better organization of courts that did
not provide for a court of equity, but it could not compel
the provincial legislature to establish one. An impasse resulted. So Governor Cosby set up a court of equity on his
own responsibility, with no authority from any one but himself and his case against Van Dam was heard in that court.
In truth, that court had no jurisdiction on principles of
equity. The Governor's claim called for an ordinary action at
law for money had and received. But such things did not
trouble a masterful royal governor of the eighteenth century.
Zenger was publishing a newspaper in New York after
1733. When Governor Cosby came, Zenger began to comment on his high-handed actions. He set up a censorship by
his own authority and Zenger in a vigorous article on liberty
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of the press called attention to the way it operated under the
control of the Governor. In another article on the right of
trial by jury he commented on the way the Governor had
tried to evade jury trial. At the Governor's instance one of
the justices of the Supreme Court charged the Grand Jury
in strong terms about seditious libel, but the Grand Jury refused to indict Zenger. However, the sheriff was under the
control of the Governor and the sheriff picked the Grand
Jury, so at the next term the Chief Justice charged the Grand
Jury violently about seditious libel and Zenger was indicted.
Andrew Hamilton, one of the great lawyers of that time,
came on from Philadelphia and defended. In those days one
could argue law as well as facts to the jury, at least in a
criminal case. He made a powerful argument based on Magna Carta, the law of the land and the liberty of the subject,
and Zenger was acquitted. The case attracted much attention throughout the country and was continually referred to
in the discussions as to seditious libel which went on in England as well as America. The situation in which nobody could
criticize the operations of government nbr even comment on
them was felt to be intolerable. This is the immediate background of the provision as to freedom of speech and of the
press in all American bills of rights. The mischief was that
the government had complete control over everything in the
way of comment upon its operations. The remedy was to
free expression of opinion, either in -speech or in writing,
from any restrictions imposed by the government.
Eight grievances which American lawyers regarded as
violations of immemorial rights or liberties secured by the
law of the land, as they found them declared in their law
books, were: (1) The imposition of taxes on and raising of
revenue from the colonies without the consent of the legislative body representing them. (2) The unification of all
the powers of government of the colonies in a centralized administration at Westminster which continually neglected or
even positively injured the interests of the colonists in the
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interest of those who had influence on British politics. (3)
Deprivation of jury trial by extending admiralty jurisdiction
at the expense of the common law. (4) Providing for trials
away from the vicinage so as to put parties to expense and
annoyance and deprive them of the advantage of good repute
among their neighbors. (5) Infringement of the right to assemble in order to consider grievances and petition the king
for redress. (6) Quartering soldiers and keeping a standing
army in time of peace without getting the consent of the
colonial legislature. This was complained of specially in New
England and echoes of the complaint may be seen in the
bills of rights in Massachusetts and New Hamsphire. It was
a method of coercion attempted by James II and was expressly pronounced unlawful in the English bill of rights.
(7) Requiring oppressive security from a claimant of seized
property before he could claim it and defend his property
rights. This practice, which reminds one of the methods of
Empson and Dudley denounced by Coke as against the law
of the land, was resorted to in enforcing the Navigation Acts
by which the British Government sought control of the trade
and commerce of the colonies, requiring exports by way of
England or in English ships and imports from or by way of
England and in English ships. (8) Referring to those laws
and to instructions to the royal governors as to industries in
the colonies, interference with merchants and traders not in
time of war, contrary to the interests of the colonies and
without any reference to colonial legislatures.
As to the first, Otis put the matter thus: "Taxes are not
to be laid on the people but by their consent in person or by
deputy," and cites the Second Institute on impositions "laid
by the king's absolute power." Also, in arguing that subjects
cannot lawfully be charged for the defense of the realm without their consent through their representatives, he cites cases
from the Second Institute. As to interference with the trade
and commerce of the colonies, in his tract "The Rights of
the American Colonies" he argues from Coke's Second In-
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stitute, the commentary on chapter 41 of Magna Carta. The
first half of his argument in that tract is based on natural
law and natural rights. The second half of his argument proceeds on Coke's Second Institute. In the instructions to the
agent for Massachusetts by a .committee of which Otis was
a member, published as an appendix to his tract, it is said:
"The judges of England have decided in favor of these sentiments when they expressly declare that . . . acts against
the fundamental principles of the British Constitution are
void." He cites Day v. Savadge, City of London v. Wood,
and Bonham's Case, and a remark of Powys arguendo in a
case in 1712 which, he shows, concedes the doctrine. If many
of the American lawyers who cited those cases with assurance for a century after 1688 were trained in the Inns of
Court in the eighteenth century, it only shows what one may
see in the English reports of the time and in the doubtful
language of Blackstone in 1765, that the English lawyers of
the fore part of that century who were their teachers had not
yet learned what the effect of the English Revolution was to
be upon that part of the doctrine they had learned from the
century before.
Even before the Revolution, along with the legal theory
of the rights of Englishmen, defined by the law of the land
and to be given effect by the common-law courts, a philosophical theory of natural rights of man, demonstrated by
reason and morally binding on all rulers, began to be urged
in America. In 1725, Gridley, the father of the Boston bar,
advised John Adams that study of natural, i.e. ideal, law, set
forth in the Continental treatises on the law of nature and
nations, if unnecessary in England, was important for the
American lawyer. After the break with authority at the Reformation, when jurists sought to find some unchallengeable
basis for the binding force of law, they turned to reason. The
Renaissance had brought in a boundless faith in reason.
Where the Middle Ages had found a twofold foundation for
truth in revelation and in reason, Grotius in 1625 had pro-
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nounced that he could conceive of natural law even if there
were no God. In the philosophical jurisprudence of the eighteenth century the idea of natural law was universally accepted. Out of this theory of a universal ideal law grew a
theory of natural, that is, ideal rights, demonstrated by reason as deductions from human nature - from the ideal abstract man. Grotius defined a right as the moral quality
which made it just and right that a man have certain things
or do certain things. Contemporary jurists on the Continent
held to four propositions: (1) There are natural rights demonstrable by reason. They are eternal and absolute. They
are valid for all men in all times and all places. (2) Natural
law is a body of rules, ascertainable by reason, which perfectly secures all these natural rights. (3) The state exists only to
secure men in these natural rights. (4) Positive law, the law
applied and enforced in the courts, is the means by which
the state performs this function and is morally binding only
so far as it conforms to natural law.
English lawyers have never had much concern with philosophy and natural law found little place in their books.
Chief Justice Hobart in Day v. Savadge pronounced an act
of Parliament making a man a judge in his own case, contrary both to the law of the land and to natural law, void in
law and in morals. Blackstone set forth the theories of Grotius and announced the invalidity of positive laws at variance
with natural law, but then set forth the immemorial common-law rights of Englishmen and explained that positive
laws contrary to natural law were not binding in foro conscientiae. When Americans were beginning to think of independence the transition from the common-law rights of
Englishmen, claimed in the Declaration of Rights of the
Continental Congress in 1774, to the natural rights of man,
claimed in the Declaration of Independence, was an easy
one. It is significant that the rights claimed by either title
were the same. John Adams in Novanglus, argued that New
Englanders derived their laws not from Parliament nor from
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the common law but from nature. Jefferson claimed the
rights of Americans by the universal title of humanity when
the breach with England made it awkward to claim them as
Englishmen.
Down to the Declaration of Independence, however, the
rights claimed are those of Englishmen. The memorial of
the City of Boston when the courts were closed because of
the Stamp Act, claims the law as the best birthright of Englishmen. The Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress claims the rights secured by royal charters and the
benefit of the common law. The colonists were asserting
something more than moral claims. Theirs were moral claims
backed by the law of the land enforceable in the courts.
Moreover, as shown by the prologue to the Declaration
of 1774, these rights had always been claimed and set forth
in authoritative declarations: Magna Carta and its successive reissues; the Confirmation by Edward I; the Petition of
Right; the English Bill of Rights. The words of the Declaration deserve to be quoted: "Whereupon the Deputies so appointed being now assembled in a full and free representation of these colonies, taking into their most serious consideration the best means of attaining the ends aforesaid, do in
the first place, as Englishmen, their ancestors, in like cases
have usually done, for asserting and vindicating their rights
and liberties declare their claim to the legal rights of free
natural born subjects, to the common law, to trial by jury,
and to assemble peaceably to consider grievances and petition for redress." This goes back to the articles of the barons,
the Petition of Right and the English Bill of Rights.
As the Englishman at home objected to concentration of
all political power in the king, so the Englishman in the
colonies objected to concentration of all political power over
the colonies in the government at Westminster. All acts of
colonial legislatures were subject to veto by the Privy Council. They could be "disallowed" within five years, and even
if not disallowed, when judgments based on them came to
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be taken to the Privy Council on appeal they might be held
invalid as not in accord with the common law or in conflict
with the colonial or provincial charter. Executive power was
in the hands of a governor appointed by the crown. The
Board of Trade and Plantations at Westminster sent him
full instructions and required reports from him to show that
he was carrying them out. The judges in the colonial courts
were appointed by the governor and removed by him. In
Maryland, says the historian of the courts, "the Governor
had complete control over the tenure of office of judges, all
holding office at his pleasure, and they came by reason of
that fact to be spoken of sometimes as 'minions of power'
or 'satellites'." The governor's council, appointed by the
crown and holding during the pleasure of the crown, was
the upper house of the legislature. It was sometimes the
court of equity with wide, ill-defined powers. It was sometimes the ultimate court of review subject to appeal to the
Privy Council. What such a polity could mean is illustrated
by Zenger's case. It was properly objected to in article 10
of the Declaration of Rights of 1774, following the English
guarantee of independence of the judiciary in 1689. Moreover, an appeal lay from the colonial courts to the Privy
Council which under the conditions of travel in those days
was expensive, dilatory, and vexatious. In one case a colonial
legislature voted to pay the expense of a litigant, successful
in the colonial court, who had to defend his judgment at
Westminster. Colonial legislatures often sought to limit the
time for appeals to the Privy Council, or to limit the cases
in which they might be brought, or to require leave of the
colonial court to bring them. Such statutes were frequently
"disallowed." In any event, the Privy Council did not hold
itself bound by them and for what it considered good cause
would extend the time or grant leave when the colonial court
had refused it. The separation of powers, which became fundamental in our constitutional law, was urged already in
colonial America as a relief from excessive concentration of
political power.
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Most significant of all, however, the foundation was laid
for a real constitutional law; for a body of precepts enforced
by the courts in the ordinary course of ordinary legal proceedings; for guarantees which those aggrieved could invoke in the courts as part of the law of the land which judges
were bound to administer, not mere pious exhortations which
legislatures and executives might obey or disregard as they
liked. American lawyers of the colonial era were brought up
on the idea of courts refusing to apply statutes in contravention of the fundamental law or law of the land.
Thus there are three points of origin of what has been
called the American doctrine of the power of courts with respect to unconstitutional legislation; a power which it should
be said in passing is not peculiar to America but has had to
be asserted under written constitutions in Canada, in Australia, in South Africa, and in Eire. One is the idea of the
law of the land as expounded in Coke's Second Institute. A
second is Coke's doctrine that statutes contrary to common
right and reason and so to fundamental law were void, or,
as the medieval cases said, impertinent to be observed. The
third is the practice, familiar to American lawyers of the
colonial era, of appeals to the Privy Council in which statutes
enacted by colonial legislatures were held void, i.e. not to be
the basis of judicial decision, because in conflict with some
provision of the colonial or provincial charter or in contravention of the common law, made by the charter the measure
of lawmaking authority. That statutes could be scrutinized
to look into the basis of their authority and if in conflict with
fundamental law must be disregarded was as much a matter
of course to the American lawyer of the era of the Revolution
as the doctrine of the absolute binding force of an act of
Parliament is to the Erglish lawyer of today. American lawyers were taught to believe in a fundamental law which, after
the Revolution, they found declared in written constitutions.
After 1688 there was no fundamental law superior to Parliament. But the law of the land still restrained the action of
the crown and of officials.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

In 1761, James Otis in Paxton's Case, arguing against
the writs of assistance, relies on Bonham's Case, Day v.
Savadge, and City of London v. Wood, quoted from Viner's
Abridgment (1742-1753) a twenty-three volume digest of
English case law from the Year Books and the reports, the
proceeds of which endowed Blackstone's professorship at Oxford. As Gray (afterwards Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States) says in his note to Paxton's Case in
Quincy's Reports, the doctrine laid down by Coke in Bonham's Case "was repeatedly asserted by Otis and was a
favorite one in the colonies before the Revolution." In John
Adams' Diary he tells us of a number of suits brought in
1762 for penalties under a statute of the Province, and of
the argument of Jeremy Gridley, then leader of the bar. The
words of the Diary are: "Authorities from Hobart's and
Coke's Reports were produced . . . that a man shall not be
judge in his own cause, and that an act of Parliament against
natural equity, as that a man shall be judge in his own case
would be void." After the Long Parliament ordered the publication of the Second Institute, Coke's teachings became
commonplaces in New England. As far back as 1688 we are
told in the Lambert MS that "the men of Massachusetts did
much quote Lord Coke." Later, Hutchinson, speaking
against the Stamp Act in 1765, says: "The prevailing reason ... is that the act of Parliament is against Magna Charta
and the natural rights of Englishmen," and therefore, "according to Lord Coke, null and void." Likewise, in a letter
of that year Hutchinson writes: "Our friends to liberty take
advantage of a maxim they find in Lord Coke, that an act
of Parliament against Magna Charta or the peculiar rights
of Englishmen is void."
In 1765, the effect of the Stamp Act, which required the
papers necessary in carrying on the work of the courts in
Massachusetts to be stamped, was to close all the courts for
want of the required stamped paper. As this had a paralyzing
effect upon business, the citizens of Boston, in town meeting,
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addressed a memorial to the Governor in Council praying
the Governor to give directions to open the courts. John
Adams and James Otis argued for the memorial. Adams'
argument went on two propositions: (1) that the statute
was against common right and reason in that it imposed
a tax without the consent of the people or their representatives, and (2) that it contravened chapter 40 of Magna
Carta by denying or delaying justice. Otis also argued from
the guarantee against denying or delaying justice and cited
Coke.
Perhaps the most striking example- of the general opinion
of American lawyers in the colonies as to the power of courts
with respect to statutes contrary to fundamental law is to
be seen in the action of the County Court of Northampton
County, Virginia, in 1766. The court was confronted with
the same situation that had closed the courts in Boston. The
Stamp Act required the use of stamped paper for legal proceedings and no stamped paper was at hand. If the act was
followed the business of the courts must stop. The County
Court in Virginia at that time was a superior court of record
with jurisdiction of all cases at law and equity involving
more than twenty shillings. It was held before the magistrates of the county and the decisions of a bench of seven
were binding upon all the other county courts. Accordingly,
a petition to open the court was presented and special justices were added to the regular bench of five. The court
held that the Stamp Act did not "bind, affect, or concern the
inhabitants of this colony," or, in other words, that it was
impertinent to be observed, and that public business could
go on without the officials incurring penalties under the act.
Repeal of the statute prevented the matter from going further, but the assurance with which the matter was determined shows how firmly the idea of judicial power in such
cases was rooted in the mind of the profession.
If anything more had been needed to familiarize Americans with judicial scrutiny of the validity of legislation, re-
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view by the Privy Council of judgments of colonial courts
based on colonial statutes sufficed. The charters of Massachusetts, Virginia, and Georgia allowed enactment of laws
"not contrary to the laws of England." The charters of
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania (1681) and Maryland permitted
legislation "not repugnant to the laws of England." The
Frame of Government of Pennsylvania (1683) provided
that no laws should be enacted "repugnant to the charter."
The charter of Delaware contained a short bill of rights
taken from the Charter of Privileges of Pennsylvania
(1701). The charter of Carolina, serving for both North
and South Carolina, allowed enactment of "laws agreeable
to the laws and customs of England." Thus in each of the
colonies there was from the beginning a legal measure of the
validity of legislation enforceable by appeal to the Privy
Council. This power was exercised in some notable instances,
as whete colonial legislation providing for descent of land
to all children equally, instead of to the eldest son as at
common law, was held invalid and settlement of an estate
in conformity to that legislation was set aside.
Thus the lawyers of America were well prepared for a
written constitution and bill of rights such as was adopted
in Virginia just before the Declaration of Independence.
IV
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CONSTITUTION

Before the Declaration of Independence the Continental
Congress had recommended to each colony to form independent state governments. Virginia was the first to do so
by a written constitution. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and North Carolina followed the same year.
In 1776, Connecticut declared independence but went on
under its charter till 1818. Before the close of the Revolutionary War, all the states except New Hampshire, Rhode
Island and Connecticut had adopted constitutions. In New
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Hampshire, the constitution first submitted failed of adoption, but a new draft was adopted in 1784. Rhode Island
went on under its colonial charter as a constitution till 1842.
The idea of a written constitution had the Instrument of
Government under the Commonwealth for a precedent, but
it was familiar to the lawyers of the Revolution both from
the charters they had read of in their law books and from
the charters under which the colonial and provincial governments had been operating, and to which they had been
accustomed to refer the powers of magistrates and legislatures. The province was governed under a charter issued by
the king. The state was to be governed by a charter promulgated by a sovereign people.
Six of these constitutions adopted before 1787 contained
full bills of rights, of which that in Virginia was the first.
The other five put from one to four guarantees of particular
rights in the text, just as the original federal constitution
contained no bill of rights but did include a certain number
of provisions of that nature. The idea of a separate declaration of rights, prefixed or appended to a constitution as a
part thereof, came to prevail throughout the land. Since the
federal Constitution was amended in 1791 to include a bill
of rights, every subsequent state constitution has contained
one. The idea goes back to the Articles of the Barons and
Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, thd English Bill of
Rights of 1688, and the Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress.
Bill of Rights in state constitutions,. since the federal Bill
of Rights, have generally followed that model. But there
was not a little diversity of items in those which came first.
No less than thirty-three items are to be found, seven of
them, however, only in one, and five more only in two. Those
which appear in less than half of the first bills of rights are
not all of them of slight importance. Two of them found a
place in the federal Bill of Rights and have appeared generally in state constitutions since, namely, that no one is to
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be twice in jeopardy for the same offense and that no one
is to be held for an infamous crime except upon indictment
or presentment of a grand jury. The principle of three more
found a place in the original Constitution of the United
States, namely, the provision in Massachusetts and Maryland that no one was to be declared guilty of treason or
felony by the legislature (in the form of prohibiting to the
states enactment of bills of attainder or of pains and penalties), the provision in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania
that private property was not to be taken for public use
without compensation (in the form of prohibiting such taking without consent), and guarantee in Pennsylvania of the
right to emigrate to another state (taken care of in the federal Constitution by the clause as to privileges and immunities of citizens). Of the others to be found in less than half,
New Hampshire and Massachusetts guaranteed impartial
judges while Maryland guaranteed the independence of
judges. In the federal Constitution this appears in a provision that the salaries of judges shall not be diminished during their term. State constitutions have generally adopted
this. It comes from the English Bill of Rights and was the
subject of a characteristically vigorous statement by Mr.
Justice McCardie some years ago when Parliament disregarded it. New Hampshire and Massachusetts, which had
had experience of the particular abuse on the eve of the
Revolution prohibited quartering of soldiers in private
houses in time of peace. This was an abuse practised also by
Charles I and James II and was denounced by the Petition
of Right and by the English Bill of Rights which also denied
the king an army without the consent of Parliament. Quartering of soldiers is also forbidden by the federal Bill of
Rights. Maryland and North Carolina, following the Second Institute, prohibited monopolies. South Carolina had
claimed the common-law guarantees in 1712 and they were
established in the first constitutions in New York and Delaware. New Hampshire required penalties to be in proportion
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to the offense, something 'with which the recent theories of
penal treatment adjusted to the offender rather than to the
offense, do not entirely agree, but which was suggested by
such things as the intolerably excessive fine and bond exacted
of the Earl of Devonshire at the instance of James II.
Georgia, in its first constitution, prohibited excessive fines.
Of the provisions to be found in more than half of the
first bills of rights, three are in all of them, namely, guarantee
of jury trial, of freedom of the press, and that the accused
be informed of the charge against him and be confronted with
the witnesses against him; something by the way that does
not always happen in administrative proceedings today. Jury
trial was especially insisted on because when judges were appointed and removed by the royal governors in order to secure judgments which the governors desired, the jury, even
when chosen by a sheriff who was an appointee and tool of
the governor, was the only assurance of a fair trial open to
an accused or a litigant. It was for this reason that wide extensions of admiralty jurisdiction, since courts of admiralty
proceed without juries, were so strongly objected to. Freedom of the press had attracted attention at the time of the
trial of Zenger and was much in the public eye because of
contemporary political prosecutions in England. The procedure in criminal trials which had come down from the
Middle Ages was excessively hard upon accused persons
prosecuted at the instance of the crown, and under the
Stuarts the chances of the most innocent were often slender
when the king was bent on conviction. The English Bill of
Rights stressed the fundamental safeguards of accused persons and they have been provided for in all American constitutions from the beginning.
Next to these, the first bills of rights provided for the
separation of powers, required by specially strong and strict
provisions in Massachusetts, but put as fundamental also in
New Hampshire, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina,
and made the basis of the constitutional frame of govern-
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ment elsewhere, though not included in the bills of rights.
Experience of centralization of all the powers of government
in the Privy Council and Board of Trade and Plantations at
Westminster had convinced the lawyers of the era of the
Revolution that there was here something more than a
political philosophical theory. The unanimity with which the
idea was put into practical effect on the morrow of the Declaration of Independence shows that much more was behind it than a fashion.
Security of life, liberty, and property stand next, guaranteed in the bills of rights in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina,
and by provisions in the first constitutions in Connecticut,
South Carolina, and Georgia. Georgia adds a provision as
to habeas corpus. I put these here as one, as in the federal
Bill of Rights, but they stand as two, one of life and liberty
and one of property, in New Hampshire and Massachusetts
and in the constitution of Connecticut, while only life and
liberty appear in the Bill of Rights of Virginia.
Five of the first bills of rights require that the accused
have witnesses on his behalf. That he could not as government prosecutions were sometimes conducted was a shameful abuse. This abuse was forbidden in New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, and
in the constitution in New Jersey. We are witnessing a return to this abuse in the denial of process for witnesses by
administrative agencies which have the power of subpoena
for their own case but refuse or hamper attempt to secure
witnesses or documents on behalf of those against whom they
are proceeding.
General warrants were fovbidden in the first bills of rights
in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and
North Carolina. This guarantee was put also in the federal
Bill of Rights.
Five states secured the accused against being compelled
to give evidence against himself, another provision incor-
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porated in the federal Bill of Rights and caused by experience of serious abuses. Nowhere, perhaps, does the difficulty
of maintaining a just balance between the general security
and the individual life make so much trouble for the administration of criminal justice as at this point. The pressure to
get convictions, which has made the third degree a well understood incident of criminal investigation, requires the
maintenance and enforcement of this provision. It was contained in the first bills of rights in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina.
Cruel and unusual punishments were forbidden by the
first bills of rights in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. The political and religious prosecutions in the seventeenth century in England
had seen some horrible examples of the most cruel punishments, such as whippings at the tail of a cart from Newgate
to Tyburn, a distance of two miles and one half, and the
memory of them was still green. This provision also was incorporated in the federal Bill of Rights. It may be said that
we do not do such things now and hence such provisions in
bills of rights are no longer needed. We do not do such
things officially. But brutal treatment of suspected persons
in time of crimes arousing public indignation, and the most
cruel lynchings and whippings by white caps and night riders,
have not been unknown in this country in recent times. If
they could have the sanction of legality or be authorized officially, in nimes of great excitement, they might revive.
In five states also exaction of excessive bail was forbidden
in the original bills of rights. This was a serious abuse under
James II and also under royal governors in the colonies. Indeed, it is a well known phenomenon today when a certain
type of publicity-cultivating magistrate attracts attention
'by fixing extravagant bail in case of some sensational crime.
It was forbidden in the English 'bill of rights and the federal
bill of rights. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Virginia, and North Carolina secured against it in the first
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bills of rights. In all common-law jurisdictions the remedy
of habeas corpus is available to secure a reasonable bail
whenever some magistrate fixes it unreasonably.
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and
North Carolina, provided that laws were not to be suspended. These provisions were directed at executive suspensions
on the model of royal dispensings under the Stuarts, carried
to the extreme by James II. But in this country in our formative era after the Revolution the legislatures at times
sought to exercise such a power, for instance, in one case,
suspending the statute of limitations for a particular party
as to a particular claim against a particular person. The
courts have refused to give effect to such statutes.
Four states, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland,
and North Carolina guaranteed against retrospective or ex
post facto laws. These were forbidden to state legislation by
the original federal Constitution as to ex post facto laws and
restrospective laws affecting property have been regarded as
deprivations without due process of law. The same four provided also in the words of Magna Carta that justice was not
to be sold, denied, or delayed; an excellent ideal but as to
delay very hard to enforce by legal machinery. In one state
recently, however, the highest court found it possible to
remedy an intolerable condition of delay in one locality by
exercise of one of its common-law powers.
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia
provided that the military was to be in "strict subordination to the civil power," New Hampshire adding "at all
times." South Carolina put a similar provision in the constitution of 1778. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland, and North Carolina provided also against levies, taxes
or imposts except by authority of the legislature. These provisions grew out of bad practices of Stuart kings and royal
governors and did not become general.
Three bills of rights, those of New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, guaranteed counsel to accused persons.
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This was denied in treason cases in England until after the
Revolution of 1688. In the state bills of rights and in the
federal bill of rights it is guaranteed for all criminal prosecutions. In recent years abuses in criminal investigation and in
procuring pleas of guilty have made our highest court very
insistent upon this right. New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
and Maryland also provided for trials in the vicinage, generally regarded as included in the guarantee of jury trial,
since a jury is a body of twelve good and lawful men of the
vicinage. The federal Bill of Rights, however, provides for
trial by a jury of the state or district wherein the crime was
committed, which district must have been previously ascertained by law, thus preventing legislative setting up of arbitrary districts after the event in order to try particular
accused persons away from the neighborhood.
Unreasonable searches and seizures were forbidden by
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. This
provision was incorporated also in the federal Bill of Rights
and has been general in state bills of rights since.
One of the most interesting of the guarantees in the first
bills of rights is the right to bear arms, secured to the king's
Protestant subjects by the English Bill of Rights since James
II had sought to hold down a Protestant majority by disarming them while allowing a hostile minority to bear arms.
It was guaranteed in Massachuetts, Pennsylvania, and North
Carolina, and is provided for also in the federal Bill of
Rights. James Wilson, one of the signers of the Declaration
of Independence and framers of the Constitution, and one
of the first Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in his lectures on law in Philadelphia in 1791, said:
"A revolution principle certainly is, and certainly should be
taught as, a principle of the Constitution of the United
States and of every State in the Union." His editor, writing
in 1900 tells us of a "natural right of revolution" and that a
"minority may as justifiably rebel as a majority," and obviously if either majority or minority are not permitted to

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

bear arms they are in no position to exercise this natural
right. This idea has a long history. Chapter 61 of Magna
Carta recognizes a right of revolution or rebellion and provides for an orderly exercise of it in case the promises in
the Great Charter are not kept. If the Puritan Revolution
did not proceed after legal forms, the Revolution of 1688 at
least sought to, and the Declaration of Independence set
forth a case under natural law. Such things as the disarming
of Uitlanders by the South African Republic before the Boer
War, while the burghers were well armed, reminds us that
the problem involved is not an easy one. A legal right of the
citizen to wage war on the government is something that
cannot be admitted; yet the provision in the Bill of Rights
stands among legal provisions and could be given legal effect
by the courts if the purpose was one which could be entertained by them. The eighteenth-century jurist conceived
that a moral right because it was moral was therefore legal.
As there were cases in which rebellion was morally justified,
therefore there must be cases in which it was legally justified.
If so, fundamental law must secure to individuals the means
of asserting the right. But bearing arms today is a very different thing from what it was in the days of the embattled
farmers who withstood the British in 1775. In the urban industrial society of today a general right to bear efficient arms
so as to be enabled to resist oppression by the government
would mean that gangs could exercise an extra-legal rule
which would defeat the whole Bill of Rights. In 1833, Judge
Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution said: "The
right of the citizen to keep and bear arms has justly been
considered the palladium of the liberties of a republic, since
it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and
arbitrary power of rulers, and will generally, even if these
are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them." He has in mind the situation
of the English kings who till the eighteenth century had no
standing army of consequence and so were restrained by an
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armed body of subjects. But he has to admit the inadequacy
of militia even in his day to meet the military needs of a
great government and gives the subject up. Here is the one
provision of the Bill of Rights that seems to have been able
to achieve nothing for us.
Along with bills of rights, the separation of powers, the
putting of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in
distinct departments by a fundamental law, binding each
and requiring each to keep within its legal bounds, is specially characteristic of our first constitutions and of American
constitutions ever ince. Analytically, the bills of rights are
bills of liberties. They define circumstances and situations
and occasions in which politically organized society will keep
its hands off and permit free spontaneous individual activity;
they guarantee that the agents and agencies of politically organized society will not do certain things and will not do
certain other things otherwise than in certain ways. But
those liberties are hardly less secured by the separation of
powers, as any one who studies the operation of administrative agencies in present day America becomes acutely aware.
During the seventeenth century many of the colonies were
proprietary. The Lord Proprietor or the Proprietors were
owners, and supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary.
Thus Georgia was owned and governed by trustees and we
have full records showing how the trustees governed. For
example, a man who had been defeated in litigation in the
Town Court at Savannah wrote a letter to the trustees complaining about the judgment. The records show that the
secretary read the letter to the trustees and without anything more they directed that a letter be sent to the Governor at Savannah to order the court to reverse the judgment. Throughout the seventeenth century the colonies were
struggling to establish their own lawmaking bodies. After
local legislatures were well established there was a still a
complete centralization of power at Westminster. Legislation was subject to a final veto by the Privy Council within

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

five years and this power kept Pennsylvania without an adequate system of courts for twenty-one years because the
Pennsylvanians would not provide for a separate court of
equity. Also, as has been said above, the ultimate control of
administration was at Westminster through instructions to
the governors, and the Privy Council was the ultimate court
of appeal. Moreover, within the province the government was
practically in the hands of the Governor and Council. Bad
results followed this complete centralization as they had followed from centralization of power in the king in England.
It is easy to assume that such things as happened in England
when the king could control the judges and in colonial America when the royal governor could control them, would not
happen in the improved world in which we live. But only the
other day the Stavisky scandal in France showed what may
happen where the judiciary is under the control of the executive. Moreover, it was not a matter only of independence of
the judiciary. The provincial legislatures had exercised undistributed powers with no limitation beyond disallowance
of laws by the Privy Council, or, if some one had sufficient
means to appeal, reversal of judgments by the Privy Council
where based upon a statute. They granted continuances in
particular cases, granted particular litigants in particular
cases exemption from particular provisions of the statute of
limitations, granted probate of particular wills rejected by
the courts, directed details of administration of particular
estates, foreclosed particular liens by legislative acts, and
enacted title to land out of one party and into another by
what amounted to a legislative ejectment. It is no wonder
that our first constitutions insisted upon the separation of
powers much more than upon the details of political organization. Often the latter were left much as they were or were
committeed to legislation. We must remember the experience
that led up to this.
A proposition has been urged that the decisive reason for
the separation of powers is specialization; that it is not "the
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practical security of civil liberty but the organic reason that
every function will be better fulfilled if its organ is-specially
directed to this particular end than if quite different functions are assigned to the same organ." Hence, it is argued,
efficiency being the end, if the separation of powers stands
today in the way of efficiency, the reason for it has ceased
to exist and it should be discarded. But too high a price may
be paid for efficiency, and experience had made Englishmen
of the seventeenth and Americans of the eighteenth century
well aware of this. As Mr. Justice Brandeis put it, "the doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid.
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to
the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."
For the most part, our difficulties with the doctrine in the
present generation have arisen from nineteenth-century
analytical attempts to maintain theoretical absolute lines.
It was assumed that every power and every type and item
of governmental action must of necessity be referable once
for all, exclusively and for every purpose, to some one of the
three departments of government so that it could be exercised by no other. The sound legal political sense of John
Marshall saw long ago that there were powers of doubtful
classification; that there were powers which analytically and
historically or from both standpoints might be assigned to
either of two departments. In such cases he saw it was a
proper legislative function to assign exercise of the power
to an appropriate department. But the state courts went
rigidly on an extreme analytical theory and it was not till
the second decade of the present century that Marshall's
solution became established in the face of analytical attempts
to put everything for all purposes and exclusively in one
place. We were awakened to the impossibility of the rigid
analytical theory by the exigencies of rate-making for public
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utilities. When the Intermountain Rate Cases decided that
the Interstate Commerce Commission could be given power
to fix rates, a power which might well be classified either as
legislative or as executive, the occasion for most of the attack upon our constitutional regime had passed. The courts
and the profession came to see that many things such as regulation of procedure, of legal education, and of admission
to the bar, if analytically they might be held legislative in
nature, were historically judicial, and that application of
standards, if historically judicial might analytically be held
executive in nature. Hence legislation turning the former
over to the courts and the latter to administrative agencies
did not derogate from the constitutional separation of powers. But the older analytical logical idea long hampered administration and led to dissatisfaction with the constitutional
regime, where it was enough to do away with the mistaken
application.
As a result of dissatisfaction with the bad adjustment between adjudication and administration which existed, especially in the state courts, a generation ago, writers on political
science have attacked severely what had been a cardinal
tenet of our constitutional law. Teachers have been telling
us that the separation of powers was only a fashion of eighteenth-century political thought, derived from a forecast made
by Aristotle, for there was nothing of the sort in his time,
and a mistaken interpretation of the British polity of his
time by Montesquieu. We are told that it is outmoded and
ought -to give way to the exigencies of efficient administration. Recently this has spread to at least one of the courts
which intimates that this fundamental principle of our constitutions should not be taken too seriously under the conditions of the time. Nothing could be more mistaken. When
in the controversies which led to the Declaration of Independence, hostility to things English led to finding a philosophical basis for the rights which lawyers had learned as
the rights of Englishmen, natural rights were put as the
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ground of what the English had learned from experience.
The separation of powers was no more derived from political
philosophy than the rights secured by the Bill of Rights. It
was taken up as the result of experience and reinforced by
reference to Montesquieu. Whether put as common-law
rights or as natural rights, the liberties claimed by generations of Englishmen and insisted on by the colonists as their
birthright were seen to be incompatible with unlimited centralized power.
Another characteristic idea of our American constitutional
polity is expressed in the clause of the Constitution, repeated
in constitutions in the states, that it is the supreme law of
the land. This idea, which goes back to the medieval teaching and decision as to the law of the land and due process
of law, as developed by Coke, has made the Bill of Rights an
effective instrument for its purpose. The idea of judicial application of constitutional provisions and of judicial refusal
to give effect to legislation repugnant to the Constitution or
to official action in excess of powers provided by the Constitution, goes back to refusal of the common-law courts to
give effect to acts of Parliament "impertinent to be observed" because dealing with matters beyond the reach of
temporal power, to the doctrine of seventeenth-century common-law courts as to acts contrary to common right and reason, to a provision in the Instrument of Government in 1653,
and to colonial experience of reversal of judgments based on
colonial statutes contrary to the common law. There is a
perfect continuity between these cases and those decided
after 1789 in the Supreme Court of the United States and
in the state courts. This is abundantly shown by a line of
decisions between the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution.
First in order of time is the case of Holmes v. Walton, decided in New Jersey in 1780. One of the rights most prized
and most insisted upon by Americans was trial by jury.
It was guaranteed in emphatic language by the Constitution
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of New Jersey in 1776. But just as the king disliked juries
where he was anxious to get results in disregard of liberties,
the newly established states, when the legislature was eager
to force compliance with an unpopular statute, showed a
tendency to avoid jury trial or commit cases to small more
easily managed juries. Holmes v. Walton arose under such a
statute. Trade between New Jersey, occupied by the Continental Army, and New York City, occupied by the British,
was objectionable from a military standpoint but was very
profitable. It was prohibited by a New Jersey statute of
1778 which provided for seizure of goods brought in in contravention of the statute, and to insure speedy disposition
allowed a hearing before a justice of the peace and a jury of
six. Under the act defendant seized goods in the possession
of the plaintiff, as being brought from within the enemy lines,
and on trial to a justice of the peace and six jurors there was
a judgment of condemnation. The plaintiff then brought a
writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court setting up that the
judgment was contrary to the Constitution since a jury
meant a common-law jury of twelve. The judgment was reversed and it was ordered that possession be restored to the
plaintiff. In other words, the state court refused to apply
the state statute because it was in conflict with the state
constitution.
Next in order of time is Commonwealth v. Caton, decided in Virginia in 1782. Down to 1776, the governor's
council was part of the Legislative assembly. The Constitution of 1776 provided for a Senate and a House of Delegates
and that the Senate could concur in, reject, or amend measures passed by the House. It also provided that the governor
should "with the advice of the Council of State, have the
power of granting reprieves or pardons, except Where the
prosecution shall have been carried on by the House of
Delegates [i.e. impeachment] or the law shall otherwise
particularlydirect, in which case no reprieve or pardon shall
be granted but by resolve of the House of Delegates." Caton
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and others were convicted under a statute which provided
that the governor should not have the power to pardon persons convicted of treason under the act, but might suspend
execution under the act till the General Assembly should
determine whether they were proper objects of mercy. The
House of Delegates passed a resolve granting a pardon but
the Senate refused to concur, and the Attorney-General
moved for execution. Counsel for the defendants argued
(1) that the statute providing for pardon by the General
Assembly was unconstitutional; and (2) that under the
Constitution the pardoning power was in the House of
Delegates in cases where the Governor was not allowed to
pardon. As to the first point the Attorney-General argued
that the court was not authorized to hold the Act of Assembly void. On this point all of the seven judges but one agreed
that they could refuse to follow an act of the legislature in
conflict with the Constitution. One judge did not consider
it necessary to pass on that question. All agreed, however,
that because of the words above underscored the statute did
not contravene the Constitution. On the second point it refused to adopt the construction argued for and held that the
House of Delegates could not pardon in cases under the
statute. Among the judges was George Wythe, one of the
great judges in the judicial history of Virginia, who pronounced vigorously for judicial power as to unconstitutional
legislation and John Blair, afterwards one of the framers of
the Constitution of the United States and Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, who agreed with him.
In 1.785, the question came up in Connecticut in the
Symesbury Case and the Superior Court held that the proprietors of Symesbury could not have their grant from the
colony taken from them or curtailed "even by the General
Assembly" without their consent. The Supreme Court of the
State used the same language. The statute was enacted before the Revolution. But the court considered it void under
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the charter as contrary to Magna Carta and so contrary to
the common law.
A statute of Rhode Island after the Revolution made
paper money issued by the state legal tender and provided
a penalty for refusing to accept it in payment for goods offered for sale; the statute to be enforced summarily by a special court of at least three judges, without a jury, "according
to the laws of the land" with no continuance, "protection,
privilege, or injunction" or appeal. In Trevett v. Weeden
(1786) on an information for refusing to accept paper bills
of the state in payment for meat, the five judges unanimously
refused to act under the statute. Counsel for the defendant
cited Bacon's Abridgment for the proposition taken from
Coke in Bonham's Case that if a statute is repugnant the
common law will control it and hold it void. The colonial
charter which then stood as the state constitution required
that statutes should not be "repugnant to the laws of England." Hence two of the judges spoke out plainly that the
statute was unconstitutional in providing for trial without
a jury. A third relied on the repugnancy in the words of the
statute, which called for trial without a jury according to
the laws of the land. The other two judges agreed in refusing
to act under the statute but gave no reason. But the only
reasons that could be urged were those given by their colleagues. The judges were sent for by the legislature after the
manner of the Stuart kings and examined as to the ground
of their action, but after a bold and convincing statement by
one of them and advice that the judges could not be impeached, since lawyers took the same view of their duty, the
matter was dropped.
Another case (Bayard v. Singleton) was decided in North
Carolina in 1787, the very year in which the constitutional
convention sat. The action was brought to recover a house
and lot which had been conveyed to the defendant by a commissioner of forfeited estates of those who had taken the
British side in the Revolution. A statute of 1786 required the
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courts in all cases where it was shown on affidavit that the
defendant held under a sale from the commissioner to dismiss the suit summarily on motion. This had the effect of
making the commissioner's deed reciting a saile conclusive
and cutting off all inquiry as to the validity of the proceedings behind it. The bill of rights in the state constitution required -trial by jury. Thus the statute not only cut off all inquiry as to whether the plaintiff had been lawfully deprived
of his property 'but it cut him off from trial of the facts by
a jury. The highest court of the state overruled the motion
to dismiss, saying that no act which the legislature could pass
could repeal or alter the constitution and used the traditional
phrase, fundamental law of the land.
This line of cases may be closed with one decided in South
Carolina in 1792; after the Constitution of the United States,
but showing how the matter was understood at the time the
Constitution was adopted. In 1712, the legislature undertook to "confirm" a disputed title to a large tract of land in
one of the olaimants, and the question was whether the statute barred the claim of the adverse party. The court said
that the statute was against common right and Magna Carta
and ipso facto void. The bill of rights in the state constitution
(1776) guaranteed against deprivation of property otherwise than by the "law of the land." But in 1712 the colonial
charter required legislation to accord with "the laws and
customs of England."
It will have been noticed that in three of these six cases
the legislature undertook to provide for summary disposition of certain cases without trial by jury. In two others it
undertook to take property from one and give it to another summarily. In another the lower house, thinking of itself as the "representatives of the people," undertook to act
without the concurrence of the Senate. In other words, the
legislatures in the formative era of our political institutions
were found doing the same things that the Stuart kings had
been doing in England. If the bills of rights were to be any-
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thing but empty exhortations, it was necessary for the judges
to give the words "law of the land" in the constitutions their
traditional meaning and hold the legislative acts contrary
to the constitution "impertinent to be observed."
For historical reasons the Constitution of the United
States is both a political and a legal document. Under it, political questions are often legal and legal questions to some
extent political. In this respect our polity retains a prime
characteristic of the English constitution from which it was
largely derived. In the English polity there was no special
public 'law differentiated from the ordinary law. Questions
of the power and authority of those who acted as the agents
of government were and still are dealt with by the ordinary
courts, in ordinary legal proceedings, on the principles of law
applicable to every one. Hence the legal side and the political
side of the Constitution are not wholly separable. But a happy
balance between the specific and the general, between the redress of specific grievances and guarantee of specific rights,
after the manner of Magna Carta, and general declaration of
fundamental liberties, after the manner of the eighteenthcentury publicists, keeps these two sides in equilibrium. Very
likely we do not justify an institution merely by showing
that it is the culmination for the time being of a long line of
continuous historical development. Yet intuition, on which
today it is the fashion to rely rather than upon history and
reason, is likely to be crude reason applied to partial and
limited experience. Experience developed 'by reason and reason working on and tested by experience have made and
shaped our legal institutions.
Three types of ideas entered into the Constitution. The
political ideas are largely those of the Puritan Revolution.
The legal ideas are those of the seventeenth-century contests between the English courts and the crown. The philosophical ideas are those of the eighteenth century which culminate in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.
There is a close kinship of these ideas. The political ideas
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are those of an era, of revolt from authority; of individual
interpretation of the Bible and nonconformity in religious
organization, and of consociation rather than subordination
in government. They are ideas of the primacy of the individual man as the moral and so the political unit. The
legal ideas are those of the relationally organized society of
medieval England, in which the king was a great landlord
in relation with his tenants, involving reciprocal rights and
duties, as defined in Magna Carta, but reshaped and restated
by the courts and lawyers of the seventeenth century to the
exigencies of a polity in which the king was governor rather
than landlord. The idea of legal limits to the authority of
those who wield governmental power, enforced as the law
of the land in ordinary legal proceedings in the courts, had
become basic in the English polity and was claimed -by the
colonists in America as no less a heritage than their English
speech. So, too, the idea that the acts of those who wield
governmental power must be reasonable, not arbitrary and
unreasonable, as a legal requirement, given effect in the
course of ordinary proceedings in the courts, had been taken
to be the law of the land or due process of law, and was held
firmly by the common-law lawyers and courts in the seventeenth century. We retained the two ideas as they came to
us from Coke, confirmed by experience of centralized government at Westminster, the conduct of affairs by royal governors, and the arbitrariness of legislatures.
Turning to the development of the Constitution after its
adoption, we have to notice that it contains three types of
provisions. It prescribes the framework of government and
prescribes limits of the lawful authority of the several organs and agencies of government. It guarantees certain
rights to the individuals subject to the authority of government and defines and protects liberties, that is, areas of
non-restraint of men's natural faculties of action. Also it contains what are in effect exhortations as to how government
ought to be carried on.
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Of the provisions as to the framework of government,
those which define authorities and spheres of action involve
legal conceptions, legal principles, and sometimes rules of
law. Both these and the primarily legal precepts which guarantee rights and secure liberties call for judicial interpretation and application. Thus even the political side of the
Constitution requires constitutional law. There are laws in
the text of the Constitution, but it is law that gives life to
the laws and to the text. It is important to bear this in mind
because interpretation and application are not the same
thing and much misunderstanding of our constitutional law
arises from confusing them. Laws call for interpretation and
law determines how that interpretation shall proceed. As to
many laws the main difficulty is interpretation, finding the
limits and content of the rule, and when interpreted, application is a simple matter of logical fitting of facts to rule. As
to many others, however, interpretation is a simple matter
and the whole difficulty is in application, which is not and
cannot be wholly logical but demands a certain moral, or in
case of constitutional standards, a certain political judgment.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that even the strictly
legal precepts of the Constitution are not all of one kind, and
do not admit of precisely the same treatment by the courts.
Thus the task of constitutional law is by no means an easy
one which may 'be understood offhand even by the lawyer.
Of the legal precepts in the Constitution, some are rules,
making definite detailed provisions for definite detailed states
of fact. Most of these are prohibitions either expressly or in
effect guaranteeing certain liberties against impairment by
government or safeguarding them by certain limitations of
governmental power or certain prescribed modes of governmental interference. As soon as it was settled, under the
leadership of Marshall, that a liberal interpretation of these
grants of power, subject to the principles established by the
ninth and tenth amendments, was to prevail, interpretation
ceased to give much trouble since most of the provisions had
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a well recorded history which made their legal import fairly
clear. But it should be 'borne in mind that the prescribings of
limits and the guarantees would be nugatory if treated only
as pious exhortations or appeals to the forbearance and good
judgment of legislature or executive. This is shown amply,
if it needed to be shown, by the fate of the declarations of
the rights of man in Continental constitutions.
Another type of legal precept establishes principles. That
is, it lays down authoritative premises for legal reasoning
rather than making definite detailed provisions for any definite detailed states of fact. Such principles are to be found,
for example, in the ninth and tenth amendments. They do
not call for interpretation. But when the court is called on
to interpret a rule, especially a rule defining the limits of
state and national power or the limitations on governmental
authority, they furnish authoritative starting points from
which the court's reasoning may proceed.
Still another type of legal precept establishes legal conceptions, that is, authoritative categories to which questions
may be referred with the result that certain rules, principles,
and standards .become applicable. Such are interstate commerce, full faith and credit, dbligation of contract, privileges
and immunities of citizens, equal protection of the laws.
These categories are left undefined. They are not historically
given nor are they common-law categories. They have required judicial ascertainment of their limits and their content. Indeed, judicial development of these categories could
not have been avoided if they were to mean anything as preserving a balance between state and nation. To leave them to
legislative and executive definition for each case of controversy for the time being would put this balance at the destructive mercy of politics, the very thing against which they
were intended to guard.
In addition, some, and not the least important, of the legal
precepts in the Constitution lay down standards to which
governmental action is to be held to conform. An example is
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the standard of due process of law established by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. History makes the interpretation clear enough. Governmental action is not to be arbitrary
and unreasonable. But the reasonable is not defined by any
rule or principle of law. Due process of law is a standard to
be applied according to the ever-changing circumstances of
time and place, like the legal standard of due care, or of fair
conduct of a fiduciary, or of reasonable service and reasonable facilities of a public utility in private law. It involves
all the difficulties involved in application of the latter standards and indeed more, because it calls for a measure of political judgment also. It is here that most of the complaints as
to our Constitution and our constitutional law have arisen,
and it is here, too, that they have had their chief justification. In the last third of the nineteenth century reasonableness was looked at in the abstract rather than concretely.
The change from demanding abstract reasonableness to looking to concrete reasonableness in 1916 was a significant advance in our constitutional law and was in the spirit of the
common law.
A few provisions in the original Constitution were in the
nature of a bill of rights. One of them, namely, the prpvision
against suspension of the writ of habeas corpus goes back
to Coke's Commentary on Magna Carta. Another, the prohibition of bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties
grew out of experience of what have been aptly called legislative lynchings during and after the Revolution. In the excitement of the time statutes convicting of crime and imposing punishment of death ('bills of attainder) or of imprisonment or forfeiture of property (bills of pains and
penalties) were enacted capriciously and were procured on
grounds of ill will in relatively trivial cases as well as in the
grave cases involving danger to the Commonwealth for which
they were supposed to 'be reserved. The historian of these
acts tells us that "the passion and prejudice of the populace
failed, at times, to distinguish between mere political senti-
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ment and giving aid and comfort to the enemy." Tucker,
writing in 1803, when the memory of such acts was fresh,
said that an act of attainder was "a legislative declaration
of the guilt of a party without trial, without a hearing, and
often without the examination of witnesses."
No bill of rights was included in the original constitution.
But people were justly fearful that the new strong central
government they were setting up would do the things or some
of the things they had endured from centralized government
at Westminster and from central governments in the provinces. Hence the Constitution was only ratified on assurance
that a bill of rights should at once be added. In comparison
with the earlier state 'bills of rights, the first nine amendments
are more concise and compact. They deal with the more vital
points, with less detail than many of the state constitutions,
but leave out nothing of real importance. One provision,
however, not contained in the first state constitutions is an
everyday safeguard of property, namely, the provision that
private property is not to be taken for public use without
just compensation. This has been included in the state bills
of rights ever since. It runs back to Magna Carta. In the
articles of the barons they asked that the constable or other
bailiff (i.e. agent) of the king should not take grain or other
chattels without paying cash down therefor, nor the sheriff
or bailiff of the king take horses or carts of any free man for
carriage on the king's account, without the owner's consent,
nor the king or his bailiff take another's wood for his castle
or other affairs without consent, and it was so provided in
chapters 29, 30, and 31 of Magna Carta. In the reissue of the
Great Charter later it is provided that no sheriff or bailiff of
the king shall take the horses or carts of any man to make
carriage unless he pays the customary price. Fortescue tells
how in fifteenth-century France private property was continually taken for the king's soldiers with no compensation,
whereas in England of that time the king could only take
necessaries for his household at a reasonable price. Apparent-
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ly the Stuarts sought only to compel forced loans of money
and impose taxes and levies under claim of prerogative, but
not to take property in specie. So Coke's commentary on the
relevant chapters of Magna Carta is very brief. But the principle behind the specific provisions was clear, and experience
of impressments of property during the Revolution led to
putting the principle in the federal Bill of Rights.
Nowadays in a time of the cult of absolutism, reliance on
force rather than reason, and of current philosophies which
disparage liberty and rate satisfaction of material wants as
the highest good and the end of government, those who
write on the science of government are prone to speak lightly
of these constitutional provisions. To some they are inconsistent with democracy. It is assumed that democracy must
be an absolute rule of a majority for the time being, and the
idea of limitations on those who exercise the powers of a
politically organized society under a democracy is rejected.
In the same way, under the Tudors and Stuarts many
thought that monarchy must be the absolute rule of an autocratic king and that limitations on what his agents could do
were obsolescent remnants from the feudal regime. But, as
Mr. Justice Miller put it, the spirit of our government is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. Democracy does not require that its agents have absolute power and
be, like the Eastern Roman emperor, free from the laws. A
generation which is willing to give up the legal inheritance
of Americans and set up a regime of absolute rule of a majority may find that in the event it is under the absolute rule of
a leader of the majority.
Other ideas urged recently are that to those who drafted
the constitutional provisions liberty meant only freedom from
imprisonment and due process of law meant only procedural
regularity. But the terms liberty and due process were legal
terms with well understood meanings known to lawyers; and
when one notes the names of the great lawyers who signed
the original Constitution - one future Chief Justice and
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two future Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States, a Chief Justice of New Jersey, and many who were
then accounted leaders of the profession, it is idle to assume
that they did not know the significance of the words they
used.
Again, we hear many urge today that judicial power as to
unconstitutional legislation is something never intended and
its exercise is a judicial usurpation. But the clear understanding of American lawyers before the Revolution, based on the
seventeenth-century books in which they had been taught,
the unanimous course of decision after independence and
down to the adoption of the Constitution, not to speak of the
writings of two of the prime movers in the convention which
drafted the instrument, are abundant proof to the contrary.
Moreover, to those lawyers the result was involved in the
pronouncement that the Constitution was the supreme law
of the land. Again, a written constitution, according to the
ideas of the English-speaking world, means a body of law
enforceable as such. The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council had to come to this as to the Constitution of Canada.
The courts of Canada, Australia, and Eire find themselves
called on to decide constitutional questions, and the highest
court of the South African Republic held a legislative act
contrary to the grondwet or fundamental law invalid upon
reasoning derived from the authorities of the Civil Law. A
tyrannical executive removed the court in the latter case.
But the oppressions which the decision of the court held unlawful brought on the Boer War, the disappearance of the
South African Republic, and a written constitution for the
Dominion of South Africa.
Our constitutional government, founded in the experience
of English-speaking peoples, has survived transition from
thirteen states along the Atlantic to a continental empire,
survived the struggle between a society of planters and one
of traders and manufacturers, survived civil war and came
out stronger, survived entry into world affairs, survived
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transition from a homogeneous folk of one stock to a melting
pot of races and peoples. Not only has it survived, it has
made a land to which people from every part of the world
have sought and seek to come to enjoy liberty and opportunity under law. Unless the nature of man has greatly
changed, there is no good reason why it should not survive
the struggles incident to modern industrial development and
economic unification.
English constitutional monarchy, based on the idea of
legal limitation of governmental action, legal responsibility
of officials, and judicial securing of the rights of individuals
against arbitrary action, survived from the Middle Ages,
through the sixteenth and seventeenth-century era of centralization and the eighteenth-century era of absolute governments, into the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth
century its latest form of a constitutional administrative
regime has grown strong while much of the world was turning to dictators and administrative absolutism. Our constitutional democracy may survive this era of centralization and
economic unification for like reasons. Whether rule is borne
by Rex or by Demos, a ruler ruling reasonably under God
and the law founds his kingdom on a rock.
Roscoe Pound.*
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